Tracy - UNIX system call tracing

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Introduction

Motivation:

- Cross architecture, cross platform system call tracing
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Possible use cases:

- Jails per process(group)
- Transparent routing of I/O
- Debugging (visualisation, replaying)
- Fault injection
- I/O logging

Background

System call:

- Fundamental interface between an application and the (Linux) kernel
- Interaction with hardware, other processes
- Invoked with a system call instruction or interrupt

Examples: open, write, socket, fork, wait

Background II

ptrace(2):

- System call: process trace
- Observing and controlling the execution of another process
 - Trap on every instruction; or
 - Trap on syscalls and signals
- Not POSIX
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Tracy does make use of ptrace on every platform that Tracy supports

Background III

ptrace(2) allows Tracy to:

- Trap on system call instructions
- Modify registers and memory
- Control the signals sent to the program
- Spawn new processes that are traced immediately or to attach to running processes

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- (Fast) memory access to process being traced tracy_read_mem(child, dest, src, sizeof(char) * 10);

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- System call injection: tracy_inject_syscall(child, __NR_getpid, NULL, &pid);
- (Fast) memory access to process being traced tracy_read_mem(child, dest, src, sizeof(char) * 10);
- Support for x86, AMD64 and ARM.
- Experimental bindings for Python

- tracee: program being traced
- tracer: program tracing another program

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Tracy is not the "tracee"!

Implementation: injection

ptrace stops tracee before and after system call, main idea:

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- Replace system call number and arguments
- After completion: "restore" to previous state, including ip

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Distinguish between "sync" and "async" injection:

- Synchronous injection blocks
- Asynchronous injection returns immediately, generates event at a later time

Implementation: pre-injection




Figure : Injection from pre-system call

Memory access using:

ptrace (POKETEXT, PEEKTEXT)

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Memory sharing

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Solution:

- Copy over to memory which tracee can only read from
- Change syscall arguments
- Read-Only for tracee
- Read-Write for tracer



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Solution: Run syscalls like **fork** in a controlled environment: spin child execution until we have the pid of the child.

```
Trampy (safe-fork)
```

Inject code:

```
fork();
send_pid();
while (1) {
    sched_yield();
}
```

Multiple ABIs

Linux allows processes to use multiple ABIs...

Very messy:

- Instruction determines ABI
- ... but the cs register also has an effect
- Processes can mix ABIs at runtime

Strace does it wrong

strace?

- 25000 lines of code
- No architecture specific files
- In other words: death by ifdef
- get_scno function is 450 lines long, all platform-specific code inlined
- And... it doesn't work (well)

strace gone wrong

64 bit program:

strace will see "writev"

strace gone wrong

64 bit program:

strace will see "writev"

Tracy does it properly

strace cont.

. . .

. . .

writev(1, [{"", 0}, {..., 140736580874188}, {"", 0}, {process_vm_readv: Bad address 0x21, 140736581373952}, {process_vm_readv: Bad address 0x10, 395049983}, {process_vm_readv: Bad address

tracy output

. . .

```
...
1688 System call: getpid (20) Pre: 1
1688 System call: getpid (20) Pre: 0
```

tracy output

```
...
1688 System call: getpid (20) Pre: 1
1688 System call: getpid (20) Pre: 0
...
```

Clue:

\$./syscall 20
i386 getpid
x86_64 writev

Application: Soxy

- Transparent proxifier using SOCKS 5.
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However, currently Soxy is buggy when it comes to supporting all the ABIs.

Not an alternative; although may be more favourable in some cases:

- Generally easier to use
- Depends on a certain library being loaded, does not work if programs directly invoke system calls

Speed: kernel patch

Overhead: Context switches, performing system calls

Example:

```
r = ptrace(PTRACE_SETSYSCALLMASK, pid, 1, __NR_read);
r = ptrace(PTRACE_SETSYSCALLMASK, pid, 1, __NR_write);
r = ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALLWHITELIST, pid, NULL, 0);
if (r) {
    fprintf(stderr, "New API failed... :-( .\n");
    kill(pid, SIGKILL);
    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
    return NULL;
}
```

Possibilities are endless:

- Buggy: Fault injection for application testing
- ► Jelly: Secure jail in userspace
- Fussy: FUSE in User Space (fake /dev/fuse)
- stracy: Proper strace

Future work

- Threadsafe ABI detection
- Research: How cross platform (or arch) can we become?
- Safely tracing children on *BSD: Safe-fork
- Speed: working on a proper kernel patch
- System call Intermediate Representation

Resources for Tracy

- Authors:
 - Merlijn Wajer (Wizzup)
 - Bas Weelinck (meridion)
 - Jurriaan Bremer (skier_)
- Idea: Ilja Kamps (Ikarus)
- Source, Documentation: https://github.com/MerlijnWajer/tracy
- ► IRC: #tracy on Freenode
- http://hetgrotebos.org/wiki/Tracy
- ML: tracy@freelists.org